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In its most conventional sense, manliness is dangerous. For manliness is 
about action, and action of a particular stripe: that which entails serious 
courage and thus that which courts serious physical risk. What, after all, 
does it mean when we tell a man to “man up”? It means that he cannot 
become a man in a culturally acceptable sense until he does something 
gutsy. 
This is why we can use the maxim man up as a pithy rebuke for those 
men whom we wish to summon to action, or contemptuously disdain as 
cowards.1 So entangled is manliness with courage that we associate the 
male anatomy itself with courage by dubbing the brave man ballsy. To 
insist on this connection between manliness and courage is not to disparage 
women in any way. My point is not that men are in fact braver than women. 
It is that men, for good or ill, are expected to be braver. Consider that 
women, if they fail to demonstrate courage, are not treated by society with 
identical antipathy as are men who so fail. For a man who has failed to 
demonstrate his balls does not become a woman, with all the gender-
specific virtues and charms that society ascribes to females. He becomes 
rather his own genderless being, an abject coward. 
Yet if manliness is a sort of proxy for bravery, manliness also presents a 
threat to society. For manliness then measures its success not by the good 
that it does for others, or itself, for that matter, but by how much danger it 
knowingly endures. An apt example is afforded by the tumultuous novelist 
Norman Mailer. Married six times, accused of beating his wives, embroiled 
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in bar fights, obnoxious to no end, given to racist and sexist jeers in public, 
and never willing to concede an inch to his legion of critics, Mailer was 
ballsy alright, yet in a manner that would seem both needlessly hurtful to 
others and obstinately self-destructive.2 
Manliness, then, is a demonstration of courage, and courage is not 
logically beholden to any moral end. As I said at the essay’s beginning, 
however, manliness is dangerous. How does the government regulate it? In 
this very brief essay I cannot explore the question in depth. I can, though, 
highlight two contrasting ways in which the government manages 
manliness, or tries to. In civil society, the government views manliness, if 
uncontrolled, as a threat to the public. In war, however, the government 
cultivates a form of manliness that relishes the opportunity to unleash 
violence and death on others. 
Let us start with civil society. Every law school student, I suspect, will 
remember a glimmering of the “fighting words doctrine” from her 
constitutional law class. The student may not remember as well that the case 
was enveloped in a vocabulary of gender. Introduced in a 1942 case called 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,3 the Supreme Court had defined fighting 
words as those which “men of common intelligence would understand 
would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight”4 and “[s]uch 
words, as ordinary men know, are likely to cause a fight.”5 The reader 
cannot avoid noticing the thickly gendered references; the fighting words 
doctrine was targeted at men and drew from their gendered worldview. The 
Court stated that “men of common intelligence” and “ordinary men” were 
the touchstone, and, although women can also theoretically retaliate with 
violence against men (or women), the Court never even acknowledged their 
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existence.6 For the Court, it was men who threatened public peace with their 
anger and, thus, men who should keep their violence in check unless there 
was some genuinely unavoidable reason. 
The federal government, indeed, wants to encourage men to develop their 
feminine side. In 1993, Congress passed the Family and Medical Leave 
Act.7 The Act entitled employees to take up to 12 work weeks of unpaid 
leave each year to attend to a spouse, child, or parent who was suffering 
from a “serious health condition.”8 The Act empowered an employee who 
had been denied such leave to sue the employer for damages.9 On its face, 
the Act did not appear to be concerned with issues of gender. However, 
according to the Supreme Court, the intent of Congress in passing the Act 
was to prohibit employers from discriminating against men.10 Traditionally, 
employers had permitted their female employees to take such leave, but 
male employees had not been afforded similar liberties. Employers felt that 
the responsibility for taking care of sick family members fell to women, not 
men. This view, the Supreme Court declared in Nevada Department of 
Human Resources v. Hibbs, was an intolerable stereotype that wrongly 
presumed that men, by virtue of their gender, were incapable of being 
caregivers.11 In effect, the Court argued that men too could properly assume 
those roles that are regarded as feminine.12 
But Hibbs, like Chaplinsky, took place in civil society. It took place in a 
setting that encouraged the quiet resolution of conflicts and a familial 
environment built on nurture and care. Manliness is expected to perform a 
very different function in the field of military combat, however. 
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The military cultivates a manliness that is violent, obsessed with honor 
and its correlates, and frequently brutal—a manliness that is 
hypermasculine. What the military yearns for, then, is a manliness that the 
Supreme Court, in its iteration of the fighting words doctrine, had expressed 
fear over. Philip Caputo, in his memoir as a combat soldier in Vietnam, said 
the following: “Some attempts were made to instill in us those antisocial 
attributes without which a soldier fighting in the jungle cannot long 
survive.”13 Caputo added:  “[a soldier] has to be stealthy, aggressive, and 
ruthless, a combination burglar, bank robber, and Mafia assassin.”14 
Consider each of the personas that Caputo put on offer: burglar, bank 
robber, and Mafia assassin—each would be a deadly felon in society. In 
combat, however, they were paragons. 
One of Caputo’s Marine instructors offered this lesson: 
He came into the classroom, let out a spine-chilling war cry, and 
buried a hatchet in one of the wooden walls. Without saying a 
word, he wrote something on a small blackboard, concealing it 
with his V-shaped back. He stepped aside, pointing to the writing 
with one hand and to a marine with the other. “You, what does that 
say?” he asked. 
Marine: “It says ‘ambushes are murder,’ sergeant.” 
Sergeant: “Right.” Shouts, “AMBUSHES ARE MURDER,” then 
returns to the blackboard, writes something else, and again asks, 
“What does that say?” 
Marine: “And murder is fun.” 
Sergeant: “Right again.” . . . “Now, everybody say it, AMBUSHES 
ARE MURDER AND MURDER IS FUN.” 
Class, hesitantly, with some nervous laughter: “Ambushes are 
murder and murder is fun.” 
Sergeant: “I can’t hear you, marines.” 
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Class, this time in unison: “AMBUSHES ARE MURDER AND 
MURDER IS FUN.”15 
Elsewhere, Caputo elaborated that “[t]hroughout, we were subjected to 
intense indoctrination, which seemed to borrow from Communist 
brainwashing techniques. This included the chant ‘Pray for war!’”16 Caputo 
remarked that “[l]ike the slogans of revolutionaries, these look ludicrous in 
print, but when recited in unison by a hundred voices, they have a weird 
hypnotic effect on a man.”17 
This vignette plainly requires the help of many others to make its claim 
that the military works vigorously to inculcate a hypermasculinity among its 
soldiers. However, it should suffice for the reader that the contrast on offer 
speaks to how society expects men to behave in ways that can be described 
as a state of fractured manliness. 
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